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INTRODUCTION 
It was Justice Brandeis who famously stated that “[i]t is one of the happy incidents of the 
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; 
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”1  Perhaps 
ironically, some of the more enriching experimentation with regard to constitutional rights 
occurs in our nation’s prisons.  With increasing litigation brought under the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (“RLUIPA”),2 the “joints between the Free Exercise 
Clause and Establishment Clause”3 are receiving a thorough inspection through the judicial 
application of congressionally-mandated strict scrutiny.   
Recent RLUIPA decisions, however, increasingly demonstrate that the degree of strict 
scrutiny that each prisoner is afforded with respect to their religious dietary rights is sometimes 
tempered by the more earthly considerations such as administrative feasibility and cost.  The 
manner in which courts have engaged in line-drawing has produced conflicting data on whether 
such material considerations should be compelling enough interests to sanction a burden of 
prisoners’ First Amendment rights.  In analyzing this data, however, one is likely to conclude 
that “it depends.”  In some Circuits, courts employ a subjective analysis of sincerely held 
religious beliefs and whether those beliefs were substantially burdened.  Other Circuits reason 
that the appropriate inquiry necessarily includes some degree of objective analysis.  And in some 
Circuits—but not others—demonstrating the “least restrictive means” requires a showing that the 
proscription or substantial burdening of religious practice furthered rather than merely 
comported with a compelling interest.  This vacillation of jurisprudential reasoning employed by 
                                                          
1 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
2 Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc, et seq. 
3 See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005) (noting that “‘there is room for play in the joints between’ the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, allowing the government to accommodate religion beyond free exercise 
requirements, without offense to the Establishment Clause”) (citation omitted). 
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the courts is reflective of the debate of whether RLUIPA can allow for fiscal considerations to 
trump strict accommodation with respect prisoners’ free exercise rights. 
In Part I, I will provide a brief background on the interaction between RLUIPA and the 
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.  In Part II, I will analyze how 
some Circuits treat similar dietary claims differently brought under RLUIPA and whether any 
lessons can be gleaned from various degrees of treatment.  Finally, in Part III I will discuss 
whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. can provide us 
further insight into how courts should handle cases involving prisoners’ free exercise rights 
going forward. 
I. RLUIPA AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: A BRIEF HISTORY 
On September 22, 2000, President Clinton signed RLUIPA into law, noting “[r]eligious 
liberty is a constitutional value of the highest order, and the Framers of the Constitution included 
protection for the free exercise of religion in the very first Amendment.”4  Indeed, RLUIPA is 
designed to ensure that government does not “substantially burden” the free exercise of religion 
through legislative fiat.  Clearly, RLUIPA’s history does not begin in 2000 when it was first 
introduced in Congress, but it is still a creature of modern thought born out of a Congressional 
reaction to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon 
v. Smith5 and City of Boerne v. Flores.6   
In Smith, the Supreme Court held that neutral laws of general applicability that 
incidentally burden religious conduct do not violate the First Amendment.7  In so holding, the 
                                                          
4 Statement on signing the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Administration of William 
J. Clinton (September 22, 2000), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/religious-land-use-and-institutionalized-persons-act-
2000-pl-106-274. 
5 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
6 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
7 Smith, 494 U.S. at 890. 
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Court realized the social costs associated with an expansive religious rights regime and noted 
that “we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious 
objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order. [Strict 
scrutiny] would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic 
obligations of almost every conceivable kind.”8  Adopting a more neutral standard, the Court 
further noted that “leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative 
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable 
consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience 
is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the 
centrality of all religious beliefs.”9  Justice Blackmun criticized this reasoning as a “contorted” 
conclusion premised on the misguided notion that “strict scrutiny of a state law burdening the 
free exercise of religion is a ‘luxury’ that a well-ordered society cannot afford.”10  Nevertheless, 
the Court openly invited the legislative branch to provide more religious protection than what 
they deemed constitutionally required.11 
Congress accepted this invitation in 1993 when it invoked its remedial powers under 
section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to pass the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(“RFRA”).12  In passing RFRA, Congress explicitly addressed the Court’s decision in Smith, 
stating that “the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify 
burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion.”13  Designed to remedy 
                                                          
8 Id. at 888 (emphasis in original). 
9 Id. at 890. 
10 Id. at 908-09 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Justice Blackmun did not “believe the Founders thought their dearly 
bought freedom from religious persecution a ‘luxury,’ but an essential element of liberty—and they could not have 
thought religious intolerance ‘unavoidable,’ for they drafted the Religion Clauses precisely in order to avoid that 
intolerance.”  Id. at 909.   
11 See id. at 890. 
12 Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb, et seq. 
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(4). 
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this, RFRA provides that “government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of 
religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except . . . if it 
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person . . . (1) is in furtherance of a compelling 
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling 
governmental interest.”14  Essentially abrogating the Court’s decision in Smith, RFRA was 
intended to apply equally to federal, state, and local authorities and served as a legislative 
imposition of strict scrutiny.  The Supreme Court responded, however, in City of Boerne by 
invalidating RFRA as it applies to state and local governments, finding that as “[b]road as the 
power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA 
contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.”15   
Undeterred, members of Congress sought to increase protection of religious rights from 
the policies of state and local authorities and introduced the proposed legislation that made up 
RLUIPA in the early summer of 2000.  Senator Hatch, a sponsor of both RFRA and RLUIPA, 
was particularly troubled that “institutionalized persons have been prevented from practicing 
their faith. For example, some Jewish prisoners have been denied matzo, the unleavened bread 
Jews are required to consume during Passover, even though Jewish organizations have offered to 
provide it to inmates at no cost to the government.”16  Thus, Congress drafted section 3 of 
RLUIPA to provide that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious 
exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution . . . even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden 
on that person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least 
                                                          
14 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb—1(a)-(b). 
15 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
16 146 Cong. Rec. S6678-02 (daily ed. July 13, 2000) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
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restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”17  Notably, RLUIPA 
closely mirrors RFRA in its substance; the crucial difference lies, however, in Congress’ 
authority to pass RLUIPA under the Commerce and Spending Clauses of the Constitution, and 
the scope of section 3 is narrowly tailored to persons institutionalized in facilities that receive 
federal funding.18   
Despite this narrowed scope, RLUIPA’s constitutionality was nevertheless challenged in 
multiple cases and facial challenges to section 3 culminated in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Cutter v. Wilkinson.19  In that case, state officials contended, inter alia, that section 3 of RLUIPA 
violated the Establishment Clause.  The Supreme Court held that RLUIPA did not offend the 
Establishment Clause, noting that RLUIPA “protects institutionalized persons who are unable 
freely to attend to their religious needs and are therefore dependent on the government’s 
permission and accommodation for exercise of their religion.”20  The Court also dismissed 
contentions that RLUIPA impermissibly advanced religion21 in the prison context because 
prisoners would be encouraged to “get religion” in order to receive the “benefits” guaranteed by 
RLUIPA, pointing out that “congressional hearings on RLUIPA revealed that one state 
corrections system served as its kosher diet ‘a fruit, a vegetable, a granola bar, and a liquid 
                                                          
17 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc—1(a)(1)-(2). 
18 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc—1(b)(1)-(2). 
19 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
20 Id. at 721.  The Court was concerned with the fact that prisoners are a captive group and therefore relied on 
government officials to properly allow the free exercise of religion. It noted that precedents establish that captive 
groups, such as the armed forces, present a particular dilemma because “there is simply not the same [individual] 
autonomy as there is in the larger civilian community.”  Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986); see also 
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722 (linking the accommodation of prisoners’ religious practices with that of the armed forces).  
In Goldman, the court held that the Air Force did not violate the Free Exercise Clause by refusing to provide an 
exemption to the dress code to allow soldiers to wear religious items such as a yarmulke.  However, Congress later 
passed a law that provided such an exemption.  See 10 U.S.C. § 774(a)-(b).   
21 One of the prongs of the Lemon test for determining whether a particular statute violates the Establishment Clause 
is that the law’s “principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”  See Lemon v. 
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).  The Sixth Circuit found that RLUIPA impermissibly advanced religion 
and was therefore offensive to the Establishment Clause.  See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 349 F.3d 257, 264 (6th Cir. 
2003), rev’d, 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
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nutritional supplement-each and every meal,’”22 and therefore could not be construed as 
“benefits.”   
Although it held RLUIPA constitutionally sound, the Court nevertheless warned that 
accommodations under RLUIPA “must be measured so that it does not override other significant 
interests.”23  The Court’s opinion, however, gave little guidance to courts below should try to 
weigh whether a requested accommodation is measured appropriately, instead placing its faith in 
courts because they echoed lawmakers in believing courts would appropriately “apply 
[RLUIPA]’s standard with ‘due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail 
administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, 
security and discipline, consistent with consideration of costs and limited resources.’”24  The 
emphasized language in this passage is often cited by courts as an acknowledgement that some 
degree of deference must be given to prison officials in promulgating policies that may restrict 
religious practices for the sake of budgetary frugality.25  Finally, it warned that although 
RLUIPA is facially constitutional, “[s]hould inmate requests for religious accommodations 
become excessive, impose unjustified burdens on other institutionalized persons, or jeopardize 
the effective functioning of an institution, the facility would be free to resist the imposition. In 
that event, adjudication in as-applied challenges would be in order.”26  
                                                          
22 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 721, n. 10.  While it is true that these items do not sound particularly appetizing, it forces one 
to wonder at what point a more satisfying diet consistent with religious scruples can impermissibly advance religion.  
As will be discussed infra, the nature of as-applied dietary challenges under RLUIPA invites confusion as to what 
degree of accommodation is too little or too much.  
23 Id. at 722. 
24 Id. at 723 (quoting S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 10, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1901) (emphasis added).  The 
emphasized language in this passage is often cited by courts as an acknowledgement that some degree of deference 
must be given to prison officials in promulgating policies that may restrict religious practices for the sake of 
budgetary frugality. 
25 See, e.g., Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 125 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1062 (quoting the passage 
and concluding “RLUIPA, in other words, is not meant to elevate accommodation of religious observances over the 
institutional need to maintain good order, security, and discipline or to control costs”). 
26 Id. at 726; see also id. at 723 (noting that lawmakers in support of RLUIPA “anticipated courts would apply the 
Act's standard with ‘due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail administrators in establishing 
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Currently, the Supreme Court has not yet heard an as-applied challenge to RLUIPA.  But 
in a recent RLUIPA case, Holt v. Hobbs, a prisoner challenged an Arkansas Department of 
Corrections grooming policy that required him to shave his beard in violation of his religious 
beliefs. 27  While the case directly involves issues outside of the scope of this writing, Justice 
Kagan nevertheless queried how religious dietary claims might play out in the context of 
RLUIPA—hinting that the level of deference afforded to prison administrators is dependent on 
cost since accommodations might adversely affect resources from going toward more compelling 
interests, such as institutional safety—to which Justice Scalia scoffed that “[a]ll you have to do is 
raise more taxes.”28  It would seem, therefore, considerations of cost are indeed at the forefront 
of whether and to what degree prisoners ought to be accommodated under RLUIPA with respect 
to their religious dietary needs.  Such questions may already even be answered by the Supreme 
Court given their stance on RFRA in Hobby Lobby—a contention which will be explored further 
infra at Part III.  But for now, the best one can do is to explore how federal appellate courts have 
been treating such claims. 
II. RELIGIOUS DIETARY CLAIMS UNDER RLUIPA: CIRCUIT REVIEW 
Although the Supreme Court has cautioned that “it is not within the judicial function and 
judicial competence to inquire whether [an adherent] more correctly perceived the commands of 
their common faith” because “[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation,”29 it is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
necessary regulations and procedures to maintain good order, security and discipline, consistent with consideration 
of costs and limited resources.’”) (quoting S. Rep. No. 103-111, at 10, 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1892, 1901).  The 
language in these passages is often cited by courts as an acknowledgement that some degree of deference must be 
given to prison officials in promulgating policies that may restrict religious practices in some way. 
27 See Holt v. Hobbs, 509 F. App’x 561 (8th Cir. 2013), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 1490, 188 L. Ed. 2d 391 (2014) 
cert. limited, 134 S. Ct. 1512, 188 L. Ed. 2d 375 (2014). 
28 Transcript of Oral Argument at 24-26, Holt v. Hobbs, — U.S. — (2014) (No. 13-6827), 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/13-6827_8758.pdf.  Justice Scalia also noted 
that he “would not have enacted [RLUIPA], but there it is.”  Id.  This is not surprising considering Justice Scalia 
delivered the Court’s opinion in Smith.   
29 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981). 
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common for courts to nonetheless engage in such an inquiry.  This is so because RLUIPA claims 
present courts with the unique challenge of applying either an objective, subjective, or mixed 
analysis as to whether religious beliefs are substantially burdened.  Such difficulty becomes 
evident when reviewing dietary cases in each Circuit as many courts apply disparate reasoning or 
adopt seemingly different standards to frame the same issues.   
Courts also face great difficulty with engaging in or refraining from considering cost in 
determining the level of accommodation of the religious dietary needs of individual prisoner-
adherents.  The Fifth Circuit is the only Circuit to have fully endorsed the view that 
consideration of costs alone serves as a compelling governmental interest.30  The other Circuits 
tend to fall just short, with many placing an emphasis on the government’s burden to establish 
primarily security interests supported by the consideration of cost as compelling governmental 
interests.31  And yet, no Circuit has yet gone so far as to hold that consideration of costs alone is 
not a compelling governmental interest.  In order to map how courts have generally applied 
RLUIPA in the context of religious dietary claims, it is therefore appropriate to analyze cases 
through the lens of how some Circuits treat such claims. 
A. SECOND CIRCUIT 
The Second Circuit enjoys a rich judicial history with respect to religious dietary claims 
brought under the Free Exercise Clause.32  A particularly intriguing case is Jova v. Smith,33 
                                                          
30 See discussion of the Fifth Circuit’s case law on point, infra, at 16-19. 
31 See, e.g., Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 190 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting “[t]he defendants have not adequately 
demonstrated on this record that the Ramadan policy is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling 
governmental interest. They assert simply a ‘legitimate interest in removing inmates from religious dietary programs 
where the inmate flouts prison rules reasonably established in order to accommodate the program.’ They do not 
elaborate how this articulated ‘legitimate interest’ qualifies as compelling; they do not present any evidence with 
respect to the policy’s security or budget implications.”) (citation omitted). 
32 Indeed, the Second Circuit has protected the dietary rights of religious adherents as far back as 1975, well before 
the enactment of RLUIPA.  See Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1975) (requiring prison officials to 
provide plaintiff with a Kosher diet commensurate with his observance of Jewish dietary laws). 
33 See Jova v. Smith, 582 F.3d 410 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. denied sub nom. Keesh v. Smith, 559 U.S. 1077 (2010). 
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wherein a prisoner—who had established his own religion called “Tulukeesh”—sought 
protection under RLUIPA to allow him access to meals commensurate with the tenets of his 
religion.34  The Jova court vacated the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the prison 
officials as to the prisoner-adherents’ dietary claims, noting that they had failed to “demonstrate 
that the religious/meatless alternative menu was the least restrictive means of furthering their 
compelling administrative interests” because “there is no indication that the [officials] discussed, 
let alone demonstrated, why they cannot provide an entirely vegetarian menu to inmates who 
request it.”35  Moreover, the parties agreed in Jova that Tulukeesh practices—although the 
product of a “holy” book written by one of the plaintiffs—necessarily involved “religious 
exercise” within the meaning of RLUIPA and both parties assumed at the get-go that plaintiffs 
were substantially burdened.  
The independent observer might query why prison officials might concede that the 
practices under Tulukeesh are uniquely religious and therefore implicate RLUIPA.  Indeed, some 
of the practices of Tulukeesh, such as the requirement of obtaining professional training in 
martial arts,36 are distinctly non-religious at first blush.  However, this may be due in part to the 
Second Circuit placing an emphasis on not engaging in an assessment as to whether a particular 
belief, held sincerely, is mandated within the framework of a particular system of religious 
beliefs.37  Furthermore, it appears that a plaintiff that generally sets forth a sincerely held 
                                                          
34 According to the plaintiffs’ beliefs, the Tulukeesh religion requires “a vegan diet that did not include soybeans or 
soy-related products with the exception of soy milk.”  Id. at 417. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 416. 
37 See Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 582, 588-594 (2d Cir. 2003) (observing that “[t]o confine the protection of the 
First Amendment to only those religious practices that are mandatory would necessarily lead us down the 
unnavigable road of attempting to resolve intra-faith disputes over religious law and doctrine” and that “[n]either the 
Supreme Court nor we … have ever held that a burdened practice must be mandated in order to sustain a prisoner’s 
free exercise claim. Nor do we believe that substantial burden can or should be so narrowly defined.”). 
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religious belief is entitled to some form of subjective analysis in the Second Circuit.38  Thus, the 
Second Circuit is highly critical of prison policies and appears to largely apply strict scrutiny in 
broad strokes by challenging prison officials to show that their policies truly are the least 
restrictive means of furthering the compelling interests invoked by the policy. 
B. THIRD CIRCUIT 
Since its enactment on September 22, 2000, RLUIPA claims filed in the Third Circuit by 
prisoners seeking religious dietary accommodations have already had a palpable impact on 
corresponding prison policies.  In DeHart v. Horn—a particularly influential case which spanned 
almost a decade—a prisoner in Pennsylvania filed claims under RLUIPA alleging that denying 
him access to a vegan diet as a practicing Mahayana Buddhist violated his free exercise rights.39  
While the Third Circuit eventually upheld the trial court’s denial of his constitutionally-derived 
free exercise claims, it nevertheless reversed and remanded the trial court’s dismissal of his 
claim brought under RLUIPA, noting “[t]he Prison has had its opportunity to correct its own 
errors under the compelling interest/least restrictive alternative test of RFRA and RLUIPA.”40  
Possibly as a response to the Third Circuit’s decision in DeHart, the Pennsylvania Department of 
                                                          
38 See id. at 588-591 (summarizing that the Second Circuit has “employed a subjective test to evaluate the free 
exercise claims of prisoners”); see also Patrick v. LeFevre, 745 F.2d 153, 157 (2d Cir. 1984) (observing “[p]roperly 
cognizant of the judiciary's incapacity to judge the religious nature of an adherent’s beliefs, courts have jettisoned 
the objective, content-based approach previously employed to define religious belief . . . in favor of a more 
subjective definition of religion, which examines an individual's inward attitudes towards a particular belief 
system”). 
39 See DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262 (3d Cir. 2004).  The Third Circuit heard Mr. DeHart’s case four times: the 
initial appeal of the trial court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief in 1997, the appeal of the trial court’s 
granting of summary judgment in favor of the state defendants in 2000, the rehearing en banc of the same appeal in 
2000, and finally the appeal on remand of the trial court’s second grant of summary judgment in favor of the state 
defendants in 2004.  It should be noted that DeHart originally filed claims under RFRA in the Western District of 
Pennsylvania in 1995, prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne, but later amended his complaint in 
2001 to state a claim under RLUIPA.   
40 Id. at 276.  The trial court dismissed the RLUIPA claims on the basis that the prisoner did not exhaust his 
administrative remedies pursuant to the Prisoner Litigation and Reform Act of 1995 because the claims he did 
originally exhausted came under RFRA and not RLUIPA.  The Third Circuit rejected this reasoning, stating that “it 
cannot be argued that RLUIPA does not apply the same standard to prisoner free exercise claims as did RFRA.” Id. 
at 275. 
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Corrections later modified its policies to include provisions of vegan meals to prisoners 
requesting them for religious reasons.41 
Although the Third Circuit generally requires some form of dietary accommodation of 
religious needs, more recent decisions indicate that it is proper for courts to engage in some 
degree of cost consideration to delineate the contours of how much accommodation is required.  
For example, in Riley v. DeCarlo the Circuit court found that an inmate seeking Halal meat 
failed to establish that he is substantially burdened where there is an alternative vegan diet that 
comports with “most” Muslim beliefs.42  In so holding, the Riley court also noted that “the DOC 
does not provide a Halal meat diet because such a diet would significantly impact prison 
resources because of the cost of Halal meats. Additional staff would be needed to check the food 
deliveries for security purposes, and kosher meat would also need to be ordered for Jewish 
inmates to avoid equal protection problems.”43  Thus, although a “substantial burden” is actually 
defined in the Third Circuit as existing where “1) a follower is forced to choose between 
following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits otherwise generally available to 
other inmates versus abandoning one of the precepts of his religion in order to receive a benefit; 
OR 2) the government puts substantial pressure on an adherent to substantially modify his 
behavior and to violate his beliefs,” 44 what may constitute a substantial burden can nevertheless 
                                                          
41 See Riley v. DeCarlo, 532 F. App’x 23, 28 (3d Cir. 2013) (“the record reflects that most Muslims incarcerated 
within the DOC eat the alternative protein diet or the no animal products diet to be in accord with their religious 
beliefs”) (emphasis added). 
42 See id. at 29.  The court noted the record indicated that many incarcerated Muslims found the vegan diet or the 
alternative protein diet to perfectly satisfy their religious needs, and found this fact to be persuasive in holding that 
the existence of such alternatives negated a finding of a substantial burden.  But see Daley v. Lappin, 555 F. App'x 
161, 164 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting “the law is clear that a religious practice is protected even if it is not deemed to be 
mandatory or practiced by every member of the religion” and holding that a federal Rastafari prisoner seeking 
protection under RFRA was substantially burdened by not having access to Ital meals, which generally mirror a 
vegan diet). 
43 Id. at 28. 
44 Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2007).  The Third Circuit follows the Fifth Circuit’s iteration of 
what constitutes a substantial burden in Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2004). 
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be dependent in part on the beliefs of others within the faith and cost considerations can similarly 
become a real barrier to accommodation of individual, sincerely-held religious beliefs. 
Indeed, the Third Circuit has similar problems with balancing the accommodation of 
subjective, individual religious beliefs and the more corporeal concerns of prison administration 
as do other Circuits.  Accommodation is warranted in cases like DeHart and Daley v. Lappin, 
because a wholesale denial of religious meals without the provision of some objectively 
agreeable alternative constitutes a substantial burden.  And yet, even if the alternatives are not a 
complete accommodation like in Riley, a substantial burden may not be found even if the 
prisoner’s subjective religious dietary needs—such as providing Halal meat—are not met.  
Therefore, although the substantial burden standard in the Third Circuit explicitly contemplates 
religious beliefs on an individual basis, the Circuit court has nevertheless had difficulty in 
viewing such beliefs in a subjective vacuum.   
C. FOURTH CIRCUIT 
There is actually a good deal of case law on religious dietary claims in the Fourth Circuit, 
and in one particular pre-RLUIPA case, a district court held in Jenkins v. Angelone that denying 
an adherent of the African Hebrew Israelite faith access to a vegan diet was the least restrictive 
means of furthering the compelling interests of prisoners’ health, institutional security, 
administrative, and cost concerns.45  The court validated claims made by prison officials that 
offering a vegan diet would incur great costs and administrative burdens in ensuring that the 
prisoners received enough nutrition and even create heightened security risks because “[t]he 
potential for inmates to make alcohol or mash would dramatically increase” due to the storage of 
excess amounts of fresh fruits and vegetables.46  Although the court did credit the purported 
                                                          
45 See Jenkins v. Angelone, 948 F. Supp. 543, 547-548 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
46 Id. 
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security risks commensurate with increasing access to fresh fruit and vegetables, considerations 
of cost and administrative burden seemed to drive the court’s finding that denying access to a 
vegan diet in violation of a prisoners’ sincerely held beliefs were compelling interests.47  Yet, as 
one Court of Appeals observed, “the district court [in Jenkins v. Angelone] cited no authority for 
its findings that the above interests are compelling,” and that “no appellate court has ever found 
these to be compelling interests.”48 
Although it appears that Jenkins stands for the proposition that the compelling interests 
and legitimate penological interests are sometimes treated synonymously, the Fourth Circuit has 
declined to allow such an inference to be drawn by district courts.  In Lovelace v. Lee, the Court 
of Appeals rebuked prison officials for failing to properly explain the compelling interest served 
by creating a policy that denied access to Ramadan meals before sunrise and after sunset to 
inmates that break their fast even just once because it connotes insincerity on part of the 
prisoner.49  In remanding the case, the majority instructed “the district court to do what RLUIPA 
commands: assess with due deference any explanation by the prison as to why denying an inmate 
                                                          
47 Id. (finding that the “increase in fresh fruit and vegetables, as well as other grains and non-traditional food items 
required by a Vegan diet, would also raise the overall cost for food services. For instance, additional time and staff 
would be needed to prepare the food and more space and supplies would be required to store the food.”). 
48 Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 800, n.7 (7th Cir. 2008).  Actually, a Court of Appeals had indeed held 
considerations of costs and/or administrative burdens to be compelling interests in Baranowski, 486 F.3d at 125-26 
(“we hold that this policy [denying access to a kosher meal] is related to maintaining good order and controlling 
costs and, as such, involves compelling governmental interests” and further holding that the “administrative and 
budgetary interests at stake cannot be achieved by any different or lesser means.”) (citing, rather ironically, 
Andreola v. Wisconsin, 211 F. App’x 495, 499 (7th Cir. 2006)); cf. Rich v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 716 F.3d 
525, 533 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding “while safety and cost can be compelling governmental interests, the [prison 
officials] have not carried their burden to show that Florida’s policy in fact furthered these two interests.”) 
(emphasis added). 
49 See Lovelace v. Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 190 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting “[t]he defendants have not adequately 
demonstrated on this record that the Ramadan policy is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling 
governmental interest. They assert simply a ‘legitimate interest in removing inmates from religious dietary programs 
where the inmate flouts prison rules reasonably established in order to accommodate the program.’ They do not 
elaborate how this articulated ‘legitimate interest’ qualifies as compelling; they do not present any evidence with 
respect to the policy’s security or budget implications.”) (citation omitted). 
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who breaches the fast the opportunity to participate in other religious observances is the least 
restrictive way to deal with a compelling problem.”50   
However, the dissent criticized the majority for “micromanaging state prisons,” noting 
that “the majority’s no-deference approach is synonymous with federal court control of routine 
prison policy.”51  Furthermore, the dissent stressed that the policy “seeks to accommodate, not to 
burden, religious freedom. The policy is not at issue because it is keyed to what the Supreme 
Court has told us a policy may rightly be keyed to: the sincerity of a religious belief, rather than 
its truth.”52  The majority responded that “our dissenting colleague . . . delves into prison 
policymaking by coming up with his own reasons as to why the policy’s restrictions are 
necessary to insure safety and security.  If a court could, as the dissent would have it, offer 
explanations on its own, then prisons would be effectively relieved of their responsibilities under 
RLUIPA.”53  The Lovelace decision presents the reader with a great example of how courts tend 
to struggle with the appropriate level of deference and scrutiny to apply to prison officials that 
seek to justify policies that place substantial burdens on religious practices.  In the end, it appears 
the majority in Lovelace stood firm and declined to allow strict scrutiny to be watered down by 
due deference to prison officials. 
D. FIFTH CIRCUIT 
It should be noted that an examination of how the Fifth Circuit treats religious dietary 
claims under RLUIPA could constitute a treatise in and of itself as it is the only Circuit that has 
gone so far as to deny prisoners access to a diet consistent with their religious scruples on the 
basis of considerations of cost and administrative burden alone.  In Baranowski v. Hart, the 
                                                          
50 Id. at 192. 
51 Id. at 204, 210. 
52 Id. at 205. 
53 Id. at 193. 
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Court of Appeals held that although a policy that denied a prisoner access to a kosher diet 
constituted a substantial burden, it nevertheless was the least restrictive means of furthering the 
compelling interests of “maintaining good order and controlling costs.”54  Particularly vexing is 
the fact that although providing a kosher diet to prisoners certainly costs more on per-prisoner 
basis,55 the court noted that “only 900 are self described as Jewish. Of those, only 70 to 75 are 
‘recognized’ as actually practicing their faith, with 90 in the conversion process. According to 
[the Director of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Chaplaincy Department], these 
numbers are very small when compared to the number of observant Protestants, Catholics, and 
Muslims.”56  Thus, it is unclear exactly how the relatively de minimis financial impact of 
providing kosher meals to such a small number of adherents of the Jewish faith could cause the 
court to hold as it did.  Yet, the court concluded: 
“[T]he uncontroverted summary judgment evidence submitted by Defendants 
establishes that TDCJ’s budget is not adequate to cover the increased expense of 
either providing a separate kosher kitchen or bringing in kosher food from the 
outside; that TDCJ’s ability to provide a nutritionally appropriate meal to other 
offenders would be jeopardized (since the payments for kosher meals would come 
out of the general food budget for all inmates); that such a policy would breed 
resentment among other inmates; and that there would be an increased demand by 
other religious groups for similar diets.”57 
 
                                                          
54 Baranowski, 486 F.3d at 123-26 (citing Andreola v. Wisconsin, 211 Fed. App’x 495, 498-99); but see Koger v. 
Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 800 (noting that no court of appeals has held that considerations cost and administrative 
burden in the orderly provision of meals to prisoners, without more, constitutes a substantial burden).  Indeed, 
Andreola was an unreported case that confused the RLUIPA and First Amendment standards by upholding a policy 
denying a prisoner access to a kosher meal under RLUIPA in part because “defendants have a legitimate interest in 
abating the costs of a prisoner's keep.” Andreola, 211 F. App’x at 499 (7th Cir. 2006). 
55 See id. at 118 (“[t]he state of Florida has reported that it costs them between 12 and 15 dollars per day per 
offender to provide kosher meals compared with $2.46 per day the State of Texas pays for offender meals”) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). 
56 Id. at 117. 
57 Id. at 125. 
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It appears, therefore, the court was concerned with the proverbial “slippery slope”—that is, 
allowing kosher meals would necessarily open the doors to other claims that would strain the 
TDCJ’s budget due to increased costs for providing religious meals to prisoners.58 
 Fear not, however, because the TDCJ later established a kosher kitchen at one of its 
facilities, transferred all of its observant Jewish prisoners to it, and provides them all with kosher 
meals free of charge, all at an additional cost of less than $100,000 per annum.59  But that did not 
stop one of its Jewish prisoners from being denied access to a free kosher meal due to an 
elevation in his security level, which caused him to be transferred to another facility where he 
had to purchase any kosher meal from the commissary.  Surprisingly—and almost in direct 
conflict with its decision in Baranowski—the Fifth Circuit held in Moussazadeh v. Texas Dep’t 
of Criminal Justice that prison officials had not properly established that denying him access to a 
free kosher meal served compelling interests and was the least restrictive means of serving those 
interests.60  Instead, it observed “TDCJ relied on bare assertions that more violent offenders 
would present a greater security threat if different meals were served, but this is insufficient to 
establish a compelling interest related to these facts” and noted that “although cost reduction, as 
a general matter, is unquestionably a compelling interest of TDCJ, we are skeptical that saving 
less than .05% of the food budget constitutes a compelling interest.  We recognize, however, that 
the inquiry is fact-intensive, and we decline to draw a bright-line rule.”61   
                                                          
58 At this juncture, one might recall Justice Scalia’s remark suggestion during oral argument in Holt v. Hobbs that it 
would seem a lack of funding can be no shelter when all one needs to do is raise taxes.  But does this mean that any 
policy is presumptively invalid if it places a substantial burden on an adherent as Justice Scalia posited in Smith 
simply because there’s always the means to raise taxes?  This question will be examined further infra at Section III. 
59 See Moussazadeh v. Texas Dep’t of Criminal Justice, 703 F.3d 781, 786-87 (5th Cir. 2012), as corrected (Feb. 20, 
2013).  The cost of establishing the kosher kitchen was only $8,066.26. 
60 Id. at 794-96. 
61 Id. at 795.  While it appears that Baranowski clearly held that consideration of cost and administrative burden 
alone are compelling government interests, Moussazadeh is unequivocal that Baranowski is limited to its facts and 
as a consequence, a bright-line rule that costs are a compelling government was not actually established. 
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In order to account for the apparent discrepancy between its holdings in Baranowski and 
Moussazadeh, the Fifth Circuit offered the following explanation:  
“Circumstances since Baranowski was decided have changed, as TDCJ and the 
district court pointed out in their discussion of administrative exhaustion. TDCJ 
has now offered kosher meals in the dining hall at Stringfellow for years and has 
offered kosher meals for purchase. To the extent that TDCJ claimed that its least-
restrictive means of achieving cost reduction was completely denying prisoners 
kosher food, that is no longer so. Baranowski therefore is instructive but not 
dispositive.”62 
 
The dissent, however, criticized the majority’s attempt to distinguish the two cases on their facts, 
observing “Baranowski’s admonition that RLUIPA does not allow religious accommodation to 
overrun considerations of prison administration is general in scope.”63  Indeed, the stature of 
Moussazadeh is reminiscent of the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Lovelace, only the Fourth Circuit 
did not have a precedent that was completely antithetical to its decision.  Again, however, it 
provides a perfect example where a Circuit court vacillates in its reasoning as it attempts to 
reconcile the rigorous, Congressionally-mandated demands of strict scrutiny with the budgetary 
concerns of prison officials. 
E. SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
In reviewing decisions from the Seventh Circuit, the way in which the Court of Appeals 
treats religious dietary claims reminds one of how the Second Circuit treats such claims.  For 
example, Koger v. Bryan mimics Jova in that it involved a prisoner who had changed religions 
while incarcerated and requested a vegetarian religious diet consistent with his beliefs as a 
practicing member of the Ordo Templi Orientis religion.64  Koger also challenged a policy that 
                                                          
62 Id. at 795-96.  It is both ironic and disconcerting that by voluntarily accommodating Jewish prisoners’ religious 
dietary needs, the TDCJ forfeited the shield it was granted in Baranowski because it proved there were other 
alternatives to denials of a free kosher meal. 
63 Id. at 799 (Barksdale, C.J., dissenting in part). 
64 Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 797-98 (7th Cir. 2008).  OTO “imposes no general dietary restrictions; though each 
individual Thelemite may, from time to time, include dietary restrictions as part of his or her personal regimen of 
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required him to submit verification from a member of the OTO clergy that his religion required 
him to be a vegetarian in order to receive meatless meals.  Prison officials, however, denied him 
access to meatless meals primarily because his religion was “unfamiliar” to them and did not 
have a clergy-like hierarchy or an established dietary “requirement.”65    The court chided this 
approach, citing Ford v. McGinnis and other Second Circuit precedent to note “even if Koger 
belonged to a religion with traditional clergy and uniform practices, a clergy verification 
requirement forms an attenuated facet of any religious accommodation regime because clergy 
opinion has generally been deemed insufficient to override a prisoner’s sincerely held religious 
belief.”66  The court ultimately held that the policy itself and the denial of the meals did not 
further any compelling interest, noting that while the orderly administration of a prison dietary 
system and verification of prisoners’ religious affiliations are legitimate concerns of prison 
officials, “[t]he problem for the prison officials, however, is that no appellate court has ever 
found these to be compelling interests.”67  The court then went even further, observing that “even 
if the prison officials’ asserted interests were deemed to be compelling, they do not support their 
assertion that a clergy verification requirement was the least restrictive means of achieving these 
ends,” and suggested that simply requiring prisoners to provide a written statement articulating 
the religious animus behind a request for an accommodation would suffice.68 
The Seventh Circuit got it wrong in Andreola v. Wisconsin, however, because it held that 
the prison officials “have a legitimate interest in abating the costs of a prisoner’s keep,” even 
though RLUIPA requires a heightened showing of furthering a compelling interest.69  Yet, Koger 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
spiritual discipline.”  Id. at 794.  Koger held a sincere belief that his religion required him to consume a non-meat 
vegetarian diet. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 799 (collecting cases).  
67 Id. at 800. 
68 Id. at 801. 
69 Andreola, 211 F. App’x at 499-500 (citing DeHart, 390 F.3d at 271-72). 
 21 
 
appears to have “set the tone” in the Seventh Circuit and the Court of Appeals again applied its 
reasoning in Nelson v. Miller—which involved a Catholic prisoner that sought a vegan diet on 
Fridays and during Lent in observance of his sincerely held beliefs—to hold that a policy that 
required a showing that one’s religion required the accommodation being sought and the denial 
of the vegan diet during the requested periods substantially burdened his sincerely held religious 
beliefs.70   
F. NINTH CIRCUIT 
The district courts in the Ninth Circuit have experienced a glut of cases filed by prisoners 
seeking religious dietary accommodations, but only a relative few have reached the Court of 
Appeals.71  One such case is Shakur v. Schriro, in which a Muslim prisoner sought access to a 
kosher diet because it provided him with meat that also comported with the Halal requirements 
of his faith.72  The Arizona prison officials, however, denied him access to a kosher diet because 
they maintained a kosher diet is not a requirement of Islam and it allowed Muslim prisoners to 
receive vegetarian meals so as to avoid eating meat that is not Halal.73  The court held, inter alia, 
that the district court erred in holding there was no substantial burden because there remained 
issues of material fact that Shakur was provided with a diet which caused gastrointestinal 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
70 See generally Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868.  Like the plaintiff in Koger, it was impossible for Nelson to 
demonstrate that Catholicism required him to refrain from eating meat on Fridays and during Lent since it is not 
necessarily required of all Catholics. 
71 Of the 195 cases that were displayed as a result of a search on Westlaw using the terms “RLUIPA,” “diet,” and 
“prison,” only 20 were decisions from the Court of Appeals and the remaining 175 cases were decisions from the 
district courts within the Ninth Circuit. 
72 See Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 882 (9th Cir. 2008).  Shakur previously received ovo-lacto vegetarian meals 
that included milk and eggs, but no meat.  He claimed that such a diet caused gastrointestinal problems that 
“interferes with the state of ‘purity and cleanliness’ needed for Muslim prayer.”  Id. 
73 Id. 
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problems that subsequently interfered in the practice of his religion, even though a vegetarian 
diet technically satisfied Shakur’s religious beliefs.74   
Although it remanded the dietary RLUIPA claims to the district court for further 
adjudication, the Court of Appeals took the time to point out that “the district court found that 
ADOC’s refusal to serve Shakur kosher meat furthered a compelling state interest, i.e., ‘avoiding 
the prohibitive expense of acquiring Halal meat for all Muslim inmates or providing these 
inmates with kosher meat,’ but the court did not consider any potential effect on maintaining 
order and discipline.”75  Taking its admonishment of the district court’s decision further, the 
court stated that it was “troubled” by the reliance of the district court on an affidavit submitted 
by a pastoral administrator rather than a food services official as to how costly it would be to 
provide Halal or kosher meat to Arizona’s 850 Muslim inmates because the it found the pastoral 
administrator lacked personal knowledge of the costs of food procurement.76  As to the least 
restrictive means analysis, the court found that “the record contains only conclusory assertions 
that denying Shakur the kosher diet was the least restrictive means of furthering its interest in 
cost containment,” and reminded the district court that “[i]n Warsoldier[ v. Woodford], 418 F.3d 
[989, 996 (9th Cir. 2005)], we admonished that a prison ‘cannot meet its burden to prove least 
                                                          
74 Id. at 888-89.  The court distinguished Sefeldeen v. Alameida, 238 F. App’x 204 (9th Cir. 2007) (affirming the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment to prison officials on a RLUIPA claim by a Muslim prisoner requesting 
access to Halal meat), stating that the prisoner in that case focused on nutritional adequacy rather than the diet’s 
effect on religious practices.  The court also credited Shakur’s argument that “he must choose among eating the 
vegetarian diet that is Halal but disruptive to his religious activities, eating the regular diet that is Haram and 
forbidden by his religion, or changing his religious designation to Jewish simply to obtain the desired kosher meat 
meals.” Id. at 889. 
75 Id. at 889.  In holding as it did, the Court of Appeals made the distinction that some appellate courts have failed 
to: the Supreme Court in Cutter did not hold that costs and limited resources were compelling governmental interest, 
but instead maintaining order, security, and discipline in prisons were.  See Id. (quoting Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722).   
76 See id. at 889-90 (concluding that “[b]ased on the record, which contains no competent evidence as to the 
additional cost of providing Halal or kosher meat to ADOC’s Muslim prisoners, we cannot affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment.”).  
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restrictive means unless it demonstrates that it has actually considered and rejected the efficacy 
of less restrictive measures before adopting the challenged practice.’”77 
The Ninth Circuit’s decisions in Shakur and Warsoldier serve as some of the most robust 
applications of strict scrutiny in RLUIPA case law.  The more rigorous demands that the Ninth 
Circuit places on prison officials in satisfying its burden of proof under strict scrutiny reminds 
the reader of the decisions in Moussazadeh and Lovelace as it stands for the proposition that 
courts ought not water down strict scrutiny and give prison officials the benefit of the doubt. 
TENTH CIRCUIT 
In another case involving a Muslim prisoner seeking access to Halal meat, the Tenth 
Circuit also overturned a district court’s granting of summary judgment to prison officials on 
dietary claims brought under RLUIPA.78  In Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, the court engaged in a 
lengthy discussion on RLUIPA, even going so far as to appoint counsel for the plaintiff to 
provide supplemental briefing to help the court define what a “substantial burden” entails.79  The 
court adopted the “substantial pressure” definition, wherein a substantial burden exists when 
government “places substantial pressure on an adherent either not to engage in conduct 
motivated by a sincerely held religious belief or to engage in conduct contrary to a sincerely held 
religious belief, such as where the government presents the plaintiff with a Hobson’s choice—an 
illusory choice where the only realistically possible course of action trenches on an adherent's 
                                                          
77 Id. at 890.  Warsoldier involved a Native American prisoner that challenged California’s grooming policy under 
RLUIPA and serves as one of the most oft-cited RLUIPA decisions in the Ninth Circuit.  However, as it did not 
involve dietary claims, it is unnecessary to discuss it here. 
78 See Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1320 (10th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 469 (finding “a 
reasonable jury could determine that ODOC prevented Mr. Abdulhaseeb from consuming halal meats as part of his 
celebration of the Eid–ul–Adha in 2005, and therefore substantially burdened his religious exercise. Thus, we must 
remand this claim for further proceedings against the GPCF Defendants and the ODOC Defendants in their official 
capacities.”). 
79 Id. at 1315.  It should be noted that not all Circuits have actually taken it upon themselves to define what a 
“substantial burden” entails in the context of free exercise rights.  For instance, it appears that the First and Second 
Circuits have not yet defined what a substantial burden is. 
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sincerely held religious belief.”80  In defining a “substantial burden,” the court noted that the 
belief of the individual is dispositive, finding that “[c]ontrary to defendants’ arguments . . . the 
issue is not whether the lack of a halal diet that includes meats substantially burdens the religious 
exercise of any Muslim practitioner, but whether it substantially burdens Mr. Abdulhaseeb’s own 
exercise of his sincerely held religious beliefs.”81  Applying this definition, the court concluded 
that “[i]t is a reasonable inference that ODOC’s failure to provide a halal diet either prevents Mr. 
Abdulhaseeb’s religious exercise, or, at the least, places substantial pressure on Mr. Abdulhaseeb 
not to engage in his religious exercise by presenting him with a Hobson’s choice—either he eats 
a non-halal diet in violation of his sincerely held beliefs, or he does not eat.”82 
Like in Shakur, the court remanded the case to the district court to examine whether the 
policy of not providing Halal meat to Mr. Abdulhaseeb was the least restrictive means of 
furthering a compelling interest.  Although the court did not therefore engage in conducting such 
an examination due to a lack of evidence in the record, it did remind the prison officials that it 
must do more than make conclusory statements.83  Thus, the Tenth Circuit echoes the Ninth 
Circuit in applying strict scrutiny and tempering the level of deference given to prison officials in 
explaining policies that substantially burden the exercise of religion. 
  
                                                          
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 1314 (emphasis in original).  This reasoning is a crucial departure from cases like Riley, supra, where a 
finding of a substantial burden is not strictly limited to the individual adherent’s belief. 
82 Id. at 1316-17.  This holding departed from some other cases where the denial of the provision of Halal meat was 
upheld because Oklahoma did not allow Muslim prisoners access to kosher meats and Mr. Abdulsaheeb could not 
afford to purchase Halal meals from the commissary.  See, e.g., Patel v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 515 F.3d 
807, 814-15 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding no substantial burden where the Muslim prisoner seeking Halal meals had 
access to kosher meals and could not demonstrate that he was unable to purchase Halal meals from the commissary). 
83 See id. at 1318-19 (citing Beerheide v. Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002), for the purpose of 
reminding the defendants that they “must present credible evidence to support” their stated compelling interests 
were furthered in the least restrictive manner). 
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III. RLUIPA AFTER HOBBY LOBBY: HAS ANYTHING CHANGED? 
By now, it should be evident that even appellate courts struggle with applying the same 
standard to the same problems; while it is true that the inquiry under RLUIPA in the context of 
prisons is often fact-intensive, we have observed different outcomes to essentially the same facts 
and even within the same Circuit.84  This is due in part to a current lack of guidance from the 
Supreme Court as to whether there is a threshold level of deference that should be afforded to 
prison officials in meeting that RLUIPA’s strict scrutiny standard and at what point would 
accommodations no longer be “measured.”  Yet, the Supreme Court in Cutter did not worry, 
stating that “[w]e have no cause to believe that RLUIPA would not be applied in an 
appropriately balanced way, with particular sensitivity to security concerns.”85  It did not 
however address whether cost considerations alone can be considered compelling governmental 
interests (if at all) in the prison context, let alone the point at which they may operate to override 
the religious practices of prisoners. 
Although the Supreme Court will hopefully be providing such guidance when it issues its 
decision in Holt v. Hobbs, the closest case courts can currently analyze as to these cost issues is 
the much publicized decision in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.—which involved a 
challenge under RFRA to governmentally mandated employer insurance coverage for 
contraceptives.  In Hobby Lobby, the Court compared RFRA and RLUIPA in multiple 
instances,86 observing that RLUIPA “imposes the same general test as RFRA but on a more 
limited category of governmental actions.”87  The Court also pointed to RLUIPA to find that the 
                                                          
84 See, e.g., discussion of the Fifth Circuit’s treatment of dietary claims brought under RLUIPA in Baranowski and 
Moussazadeh, supra, at 15-18. 
85 Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722.  Cognizant that “[l]awmakers supporting RLUIPA were mindful of the urgency of 
discipline, order, safety, and security in penal institutions,” Id., the Cutter Court acknowledged that security interests 
were chief compelling governmental interests. 
86 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2761-62, 2772, 2774-75, 2781, 2792 (2014). 
87 Id. at 2761. 
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“exercise of religion” under RFRA “must be given the same broad meaning that applies under 
RLUIPA.”88  Most crucially, however, was the Court’s following observation:   
“We do not doubt that cost may be an important factor in the least-restrictive-
means analysis, but both RFRA and its sister statute, RLUIPA, may in some 
circumstances require the Government to expend additional funds to 
accommodate citizens’ religious beliefs. Cf. § 2000cc–3(c) (RLUIPA: ‘[T]his 
chapter may require a government to incur expenses in its own operations to 
avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise.’).  HHS’s view that 
RFRA can never require the Government to spend even a small amount reflects a 
judgment about the importance of religious liberty that was not shared by the 
Congress that enacted that law.”89 
 
Indeed, one of the less restrictive means the Court found the government could employ is by 
“assuming the cost,” noting that “[i]t seems likely . . . that the cost of providing the forms of 
contraceptives at issue in these cases (if not all FDA-approved contraceptives) would be minor 
when compared with the overall cost of ACA.”90  This reasoning closely parallels the type of 
scrutiny that the Fifth Circuit employed in Moussazadeh, where it compared the cost of 
providing kosher meals to the overall budget and cast doubt on whether the government could 
truly not afford providing such meals to prisoners that requested them in accordance with their 
sincerely held beliefs.91   
So has Hobby Lobby changed anything with regard to how courts ought to treat claims 
under RLUIPA?  It appears that Hobby Lobby at least supports Justice Scalia in observing in 
Smith and again during oral argument for Holt v. Hobbs that as long as the cost to the 
government is relatively de minimis in proportion to its budget, the least-restrictive-means 
analysis would lead courts to the ultimate conclusion that as long as a substantial burden is 
                                                          
88 Id. at 2762, n. 5.  Justice Ginsburg disagreed with this reasoning by noting “RFRA incorporates RLUIPA’s 
definition of ‘exercise of religion,’ as RLUIPA does, but contains no omnibus rule of construction governing the 
statute in its entirety.”  Id. at 2792, n. 10 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
89 Id. at 2781. 
90 Id. 
91 See Moussazadeh, 703 F.3d at 795; see also discussion, supra, at 17-18. 
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established, then a policy or law would be per se presumptively invalid.92  And if taxes could 
always be raised to increase such a budget, then it follows that courts may effectively legislate 
from the bench vis-à-vis requiring prison officials to accommodate prisoners’ religious dietary 
needs, regardless of cost. In fact, this very point was debated at length by the Supreme Court in 
Hobby Lobby, with the majority denying that its decision forces the government to create an 
entirely new program to subsidize all contraceptives,93 and the dissent pointing out that there is 
no stopping point to this line of reasoning that the government could just “pick up the tab.”94  
Justice Ginsburg—who wrote the Court’s opinion in Cutter—strongly labored on this latter point 
in her dissent, positing “[d]oes it rank as a less restrictive alternative to require the government to 
provide the money or benefit to which the employer has a religion-based objection?”95   
It would appear, therefore, at least the author of the Court’s opinion in Cutter worries that 
as long as taxpayers can foot the bill for religious accommodations under RFRA, there may 
always a less restrictive alternative.  However, it remains to be seen whether such fears will be 
vindicated.  If there is any lesson that courts can glean from both Cutter and Hobby Lobby, it is 
that courts that err on the side of accommodation when faced with religious dietary claims under 
RLUIPA are likelier to be vindicated in declining to afford deference to policies implemented 
solely in the interest of minimizing costs. 
 
                                                          
92 See generally discussion, supra, at 4-9; Smith, 494 U.S. at 888 (“If the ‘compelling interest’ test is to be applied at 
all, then, it must be applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously commanded. Moreover, if 
‘compelling interest’ really means what it says (and watering it down here would subvert its rigor in the other fields 
where it is applied), many laws will not meet the test. Any society adopting such a system would be courting 
anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society’s diversity of religious beliefs, and its 
determination to coerce or suppress none of them.”). 
93 See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2786 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“In these cases, it is the Court's understanding 
that an accommodation may be made to the employers without imposition of a whole new program or burden on the 
Government”). 
94 See id. at 2802-2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (querying “where is the stopping point to the ‘let the government 
pay’ alternative?”). 
95 Id. at 2802 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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CONCLUSION 
A review of how the Circuit courts treat religious dietary claims brought by prisoners 
under RLUIPA reveals their apparent discomfort and lack of assuredness in applying strict 
scrutiny to prison policies.  This is due to a number of factors, ranging from a current lack of 
guidance from the Supreme Court to whether considerations of cost alone can insulate a policy 
from judicial scrutiny.  However, if the Supreme Court’s decisions in Cutter and Hobby Lobby 
can provide any guidance, then courts would do well to adhere to Congressional mandate that 
RLUIPA “shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum 
extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution,”96 and err on the side of 
accommodating prisoners’ substantially burdened, sincerely-held beliefs even if it means that the 
government—and by extension taxpayers—must foot the bill for prisoners’ specialized, religious 
diets. 
 
                                                          
96 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(g). 
